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Introduction
The Portuguese colonization, throughout the 18th and 19th centuries, 
was the first bond established between Brazil and the African continent, and 
it was especially deepened by the slave trade. With the Brazilian independence 
in 1822, as well as with the end of the slave trade across the Atlantic, between 
1845 and 1850, there was a gradual movement away from said continent, once 
the imperial foreign policy axis was now directed towards the River Plate, to 
the South, as well as to England, Western Europe and the North of the global 
system. In the 20th century, along with the two World Wars, the creation of 
the United Nations, and the Cold War, Brazil’s international projection was 
drawn according to the opportunities presented in this new world system.
The aim of the present paper is thus to analyze the ambiguity between 
Brazilian political discourse and foreign practice with regard to the Portu-
guese colonies. The research problem consists in identifying which aspects 
have exerted an influence on the definition of Brazil’s African policy. As a 
research question, it is assumed that Brazil, since the Independent Foreign 
Policy (IFP), with its discourse of non-alignment with the powers of the world 
system, the identification with the Third Worldist theses, and based on the 
politics of the “3Ds” (development, decolonization and disarmament), suppor-
ted the anti-colonial principle and was an advocate for the self-determination 
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of peoples. However, an ambiguity was evident by the official political align-
ment with Portugal, due to the 1953 Treaty of Friendship and Consultation.
In 1974, this ambiguity officially came to an end, with the indepen-
dence of the Portuguese colonies in Africa and their recognition by Brazil, 
within a pragmatic and universalist framework of foreign policy. Methodo-
logically, the research is classified as descriptive-explanatory in relation to its 
objectives. It applied the quanti-qualitative approach with the hypothetical-
deductive method, since, according to Popper (1975), science is hypothetical 
and provisional, not a definitive knowledge. Based on the identified research 
problem, the research-generating question (hypothesis) was formulated, 
which in turn was tested through the procedures of bibliographic and docu-
mentary analysis of primary, secondary and press sources. After analyzing 
the results, the previously elaborated generating question was evaluated and 
eventually corroborated.
From 1951 to 1964: from the nationalist bargain to the IFP, 
nuances of African policy
Brazilian history is also based upon aspects from African cultures 
and societies, as slavery and the slave trade are two of the bonds responsible 
for building this relationship, which lasted from the 16th until the end of the 
19th century, within the logic of the capitalist system and the international 
division of labor, which framed the Brazilian colony in a matrix of European 
liberalism, based on the monoculture of large areas of land. Brazil’s with-
drawal from the African continent, from its independence until the first 
half of the 1940s, reflects the sum of two aspects of the historical process of 
foreign policy, according to Saraiva (2012): the ideological, marked by the role 
of the Brazilian elite of the time, which sought to build a nation according 
to “modern and Western nations”; on the other hand, the material aspect, 
which stood out for the irrelevance of economic and commercial relations 
with Africa. In addition, it is important to emphasize that the policy of domi-
nation of the colonial powers had made international relations of the African 
continent impossible up to that point.
Domestic and structural changes in the world system since the inter
-war period and in the post-World War II led Brazil to revise the axis of its 
foreign policy, as a result of changes in the country’s options for international 
projection. The Cold War shaped the world system and Brazilian foreign 
policy was again linked to Washington during Dutra’s administration. The 
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role played by Raul Fernandes in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRE) was 
conservative in essence and deeply linked to US interests, which were often 
contradictory to those ones of Brazil. In turn, Osvaldo Aranha, then president 
of the United Nations General Assembly and head of the Brazilian delegation 
to the United Nations, perceived that the foreign policy of Brazil being the 
United States’ preferred ally did not exist, since Washington’s interests were 
directed to other regions of the globe.
According to Vizentini (2008), Vargas’ second government represen-
ted a rupture with the diplomatic aspects of Dutra’s government, marking 
the beginning of a new conduct for Brazilian foreign policy, which would 
reach its peak in 1961, with the Independent Foreign Policy (IFP). The idea 
of Vizentini (2004b) is used when analyzing the IFP since 1951, because “[...] 
it is closely linked to an industrial development model by import substitu-
tion, which, both in its economic and political-diplomatic aspects, presents 
a certain unity between 1951 and 1964” (Vizentini 2004b, 31).
However, the first contacts with Africa in this new phase of rappro-
chement took place in the commercial-political sphere, with the aim of stren-
gthening the competitiveness of African and Brazilian primary products in 
the international market, especially the commercial partnership with South 
Africa. According to Penha (2011), Brazil’s first concerns with Africa were 
grouped into three orders: economic (by the aspects already mentioned), poli-
tical (in the dialogue with Portugal and in the creation of the Luso-Brazilian 
community), and strategic (with the process of decolonization of Africa, a 
space of interest for Brazilian action in the South Atlantic region). 
The 1950s brought the agenda of national struggles for independence 
in the African continent to the world system. In Brazil, industrial moderni-
zation and urban growth led up to the emergence of new political actors and 
new demands in the consolidation of the so-called Developmental State. The 
presence of an emerging middle class and business interests brought new 
aspects to foreign policy. Development became more acute as a vector in this 
period, with diplomacy being used as a useful tool to ensure new spaces that 
would favor foreign investment for the national project. On the other side 
of the South Atlantic, African nationalism would flourish, being strengthe-
ned by its identification with the Third World. The Bandung Conference 
in Indonesia in 1955, according to Venâncio (2009), represented a boost to 
the struggle for independence of African countries, as well as an encoura-
gement to the leaders of the movements against both European colonialism 
and the inferiorization of the black man. Later, in 1958, the 1st Conference 
of Independent States of Africa was held in Accra (Ghana’s capital), which 
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took up Bandung’s principles, strengthening support to African peoples still 
under colonial rule, and also encouraging African union (Venâncio 2009). 
In 1963, the founding of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) crowned 
this movement.
In the second Vargas government (1951-1954), foreign policy was 
evidently noted as an instrument of national defense to achieve the develo-
pmental project. The international context put Vargas in a limited position 
to manoeuvre. Through the nationalist bargaining, the President sought to 
diversify his partners, and Africa’s place in his policy belonged to the set of 
less developed areas of the world system. However, the Brazilian abstention 
in the face of the decolonization of Africa stands out. According to Vargas, 
the development of the colonies would occur with the continuing of the 
colonization, and the rule of João Neves da Fontoura in the MRE judged the 
conditions of economic development in the relation between colony and 
colonizer.
However, with the ministerial reform of 1953, the idea of preserving 
metropolitan interests in the African colonies became more acute with the 
appointment of the UDN-linked conservative Vicente Ráo to the MRE. It was 
at this time that the initiatives on Brazil’s side were presented, as well as the 
last observations that were necessary to give birth to the Treaty of Friendship 
and Consultation with Portugal in 1953. Such a treaty would deeply establish 
bilateral connections through mutual consultation on international policy 
issues, with the exception of issues affecting American and Iberian territories. 
According to Pinheiro (1989), there were two explanatory reasons for this 
support: on the one hand, the existence of a Portuguese lobby in Brazilian 
society, representing the most traditional Portuguese interests; and, on the 
other hand, the strategic interests of both countries over the South Atlantic 
(Pinheiro 1989 apud Rizzi 2014). In addition, according to Cervo (2011): 
[...] His main intention was to resolve the antagonism between the two 
countries because of the incompatibility between Brazilian foreign policy, 
guided by national development and the logical support for decoloniza-
tion, on the one hand, and the Portuguese foreign option of maintaining 
its late colonialism, on the other hand. The treatment will fundamentally 
exercise the function of perpetuating sentimentality in bilateral relations 
(Cervo 2011, p. 48).
 For Portugal, the Treaty represented a political need to sustain the 
regime of António de Oliveira Salazar, as well as reaffirming the Portuguese 
status in the world system: since democracies emerged victorious from the 
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Second World War, it was appropriate for non-democratic countries such as 
Spain, Portugal, and Brazil to adapt to the new world order in accordance with 
the West. To this end, Vargas convened elections and established democracy 
in 1945. In turn, Salazar continued to maintain his regime. However, the 
hardships that Portugal encountered in maintaining its image in the West, 
as well as in integrating with the United Nations, led its diplomacy to seek 
mechanisms in favor of maintaining its status. It then sought to integrate 
with multilateral institutions such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) and to strengthen relations with Atlantic countries, such as the Uni-
ted States and Brazil (Cervo 2011) 
Portugal felt threatened by the commitment assumed by the United 
Nations to give political autonomy to the peoples submitted to colonial rule 
(and by the process initiated by the British independence to the Indians), 
factors that led it to be concerned with the maintenance of its colonies in 
Asia and Africa. For this reason, Brazil started to be seen as a strategic ally 
of Lisbon in terms of defending its colonial empire. From this context, the 
political need to re-establish the historical and cultural ties between Brazil 
and Portugal, and the creation of the Luso-Brazilian community generated 
the 1953 Treaty.
In the government of Café Filho (1954-1956), Raul Fernandes’ con-
servative stance in Itamaraty reoriented the axis of foreign policy towards the 
North, re-approaching the USA. In the ensuing government, of Juscelino 
Kubitschek (1956-1960), foreign policy was characterized by the association of 
nationalism with foreign capital. Africa received the Brazilian discretion and 
disinterest for its national struggles under the effervescence of great changes 
in the African continent. Brazil’s silent stance towards the first independent 
nation of sub-Saharan Africa (Ghana, in 1957), along with the independence 
movements that flourished, represented an awakening of Africa after the Ban-
dung Conference, in 1955, which would be the first steps that would converge, 
only in 1963, in the creation of the Organization of African Unity (OUA). 
Kubitschek’s central concern was the developing economic rela-
tions between Europe and Africa, without taking into account the status 
of overcoming or not the colonial situation. With the creation of the Euro-
pean Common Market (ECM) in 1957, a clause certifying the integration of 
African countries into the European market through the protection of their 
products was incorporated. For Brazil, Africa’s indirect participation in the 
ECM became a commercial threat (Cervo 2011). The concern of Brazilian 
foreign policy makers was based on the suspicion that international finan-
cing for the development of countries such as Brazil would be directed to 
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Africa, in addition to being based on the restriction of Brazilian products to 
the MCE, because the fear was that African products could be favored (due 
to exemptions from trade tariffs for African products and the low price of 
the African labor force). Furthermore, Cervo (2011) mentions that, for Brazil, 
the association of African and European economies, for preferential trade 
reasons, could affect the Brazilian development project by limiting the entry 
of Brazilian products to the European market. In addition to the creation of 
the ECM with the African association, the possibility of US and European 
investments in Brazil being threatened was also considered. For this reason, 
the possibility of the Pan American Operation (OPA) was, to a certain extent, 
a response to this situation.
In 1957, in the IV Commission of the General Assembly of the United 
Nations, Brazil supported project A/C.4/L.404, whose content mentioned 
that the Portuguese overseas provinces would be called non-autonomous 
territories, still belonging to Portugal. However, this stance did not receive 
unanimous support of Brazilian society and of Itamaraty itself. Political and 
intellectual leaderships advocated for the rapprochement with Africa, as they 
understood that the changes in the world system required a reform in the 
formulation of Brazilian foreign policy (Rizzi 2014).   
The foreign policy under the government of Jânio Quadros (1961), in 
accordance with the guidelines of the IFP, had a discourse of non-alignment 
with the powers of the world system, was identified with the Third Worldist 
theses, and supported the anti-colonial principle, being Brazil an advocate 
of the self-determination of peoples. However, that ambiguity was still evi-
dent in the official Portugal-Brazil political alignment. It is noticeable that 
the IFP is the phase of Africa’s reintroduction into the external agenda and 
the gestation of Brazil’s African policy, as well as being an outcome of the 
independence processes  of most African countries between 1957 and 1960.
Brazil’s rapprochement with Africa was based on “... the idea that 
both economic development and the ability to exert a certain regional 
influence should evolve in the same direction” (Penha 2011, 151). The first 
nuances of Brazil’s African policy were based on the search for new political 
and commercial partners, and it provided new opportunities for Brazil’s 
international insertion. The strategy used to reshape the country’s role in 
the world system represented the establishment of relations with socialist 
countries in Europe and Asia, likewise with the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics (USSR) and Cuba, and the revision of relations with the USA. 
Thus, “Africa began to be seen as a new space for Brazil to exercise influence 
in the South Atlantic region” (Penha 2011, 151). 
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The IFP’s guidelines represented a milestone in Brazilian foreign 
policy, as they were universal and non-exclusive, since the new possibilities 
allowed Brazil to assert itself as an influential actor in the world system. In 
this sense, it was sought to use foreign policy as an instrument for the inter-
national projection of the country, and the principles that guided the IFP 
were defined at the economic-political level. The search for new international 
markets and the intensification of trade relations with other partners turned 
foreign policy into a mechanism to achieve the economic development of 
the country. On the other hand, in the political sphere, the promotion of 
dialogue for conflict resolution, non-intervention in the internal affairs of 
other states, self-determination of peoples, and emphasis on international 
law was identified. What was noted was the attempt to take Brazil up to a 
level of autonomy in a pragmatic strategy.
In line with what Jaguaribe (1979) states, it is understood that the 
post-World War II world system was marked by relations of two orders: the 
one between the superpowers (US and USSR), characterized as complex 
relations of cooperation and conflict, and the ones between the center and the 
periphery, within each imperial system. The level of autonomy3 of the system 
is based on “a complex network of interrelated interests within a profoundly 
asymmetrical framework, which privileges the center over the periphery” 
(Jaguaribe 1979, 95)4. Such asymmetry was based on the economic-techno-
logical and political-military superiority of the United States, which ensured 
its interests in the world system. 
As for states, they need national viability and international permissi-
bility to hold a greater degree of autonomy in the global system. The national 
viability is subordinated to the historical-geographical and socio-cultural cir-
cumstances and to the availability of human and natural resources (Jaguaribe 
1979). In this sense, it can be seen that the period studied presents an interes-
ting margin of national viability, with different degrees in each government. 
In the Jânio government (and later in the Geisel government), there was a 
high degree of national viability, because Brazil had an expanding economy. 
The international permissibility, besides being of more abstract speci-
fication, approaches the internal and external capacity to neutralize the risks 
arising from third parties in the world system (Jaguaribe 1979). It should be 
noted that the Cold War conjuncture offered Brazil a considerable level of 
international permissibility (between 1961-63 and between 1974-85, espe-
3 According to the author, the level of autonomy can only be clearly perceived within the 
scope of the North American empire, in whose orbit Brazil was located.
4 Our translation.
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cially), allowing it to act in the world system questioning, to a certain extent, 
the current order and the inequalities between the central and peripheral 
states.
Autonomy, national viability and international permissibility are 
key concepts in understanding the characteristics of Brazil’s African policy, 
which emerged in 1961 and was consolidated in the 1970s. It was the com-
bination of the analysis between the possibilities and internal demands with 
the external possibilities identified, within a pattern of conduct based on the 
“3Ds” of Araújo Castro, that overcame the obstacles of the forming aspects 
of African politics in this period of the Cold War, within the consolidation of 
the Brazilian Developmental State.
Brazil’s support for the principle of self-determination of the peoples 
in Africa, as well as the use of foreign policy as a means of fighting against 
racism and colonialism, did not mean Brazil’s adherence to the Third World 
bloc. Quadros argued that Brazil’s African policy would be a “modest reward” 
for Brazil’s immense debt to African peoples. However, the power vacuum 
left by the colonial powers was seen as an opportunity for Brazil’s projection 
towards the African continent.
In terms of foreign trade, the Quadros and Goulart governments 
opted to approach African governments directly. The main concern was to 
undo the image created in previous decades of unfair competition between 
African and Brazilian products in the ECM5. The new Africanist inclinations 
of Brazilian diplomacy received strong opposition. At the international level, 
the African policy of Quadros received the disapproval of Portugal, which 
considered it contradictory to Portuguese interests in Africa. Luso-Brazilian 
relations represented the first obstacle to his anti-colonialist policy. However, 
in the 15th General Assembly of the United Nations the ambiguity in the Bra-
zilian discourse was strengthened. At first, the Brazilian delegation voted in 
favor of the project “Declaration on Granting Independence to Colonial Peo-
ples and Countries” presented by Asian and African countries. On the other 
hand, Brazil voted against the resolution that requested Portugal to present 
social, economic, and political information about its colonies. Moreover, it 
5 According to Penha (2011), Brazil sought to regulate its relations with Africa with the 
following initiatives: 1) the Brazilian request at the United Nations Assembly in 1961 and 
1962 for a review of the institutional structure of international trade because it was unfair 
to developing countries. The discussions resulted in the First International Conference on 
Trade and Development (INCTAD) in Geneva (1964). 2) the signing of the International 
Coffee Agreement, implemented in 1963, to constitute a policy of controlling production and 
promoting exports at profitable prices.
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was pointed out that Brazil has always argued that such Portuguese territories 
were not dependent, but provinces of a unitary state (Brasil 1960, 14-15). 
Internally, the National Democratic Union (UDN) and the military 
did not support the IFP as they believed that African policy and dialogue 
with the countries of Eastern Europe and Cuba meant an alignment with 
communist regimes. It is important to mention the role of the Portuguese 
lobby that questioned the Brazilian government when its attitudes were con-
tradictory to Lisbon’s interests, emphasizing the principles of the Luso-Bra-
zilian community. 
It is important to highlight the bilateral relations with South Africa 
during this period, since this country was a Brazilian trade partner. Pretoria, 
in turn, guided its relations with Brasília under a more political-strategic bias, 
since it sought support for its incorporation into the world system. According 
to Penna Filho (2010), Brasília-Pretoria relations had some practical implica-
tions for the Brazilian government. In the first place, it meant the expansion 
of Brazil’s foreign trade at the time when the industrialization process began. 
Secondly, the relation with South Africa represented an opportunity for Brazil 
to project into a region of strategic importance. In the third place, this relation 
evidenced the filling of a void in the field of Brazil’s foreign relations after its 
departure from Africa. However, the author highlights two events that were 
responsible for the cooling of relations between Brazil and South Africa: the 
illegal South African occupation of Southwest Africa (currently Namibia) 
and the regime of racial segregation. Brazil’s was against the annexation of 
the territory of Southwest Africa, as it supported the independence of this 
colony alongside the United Nations.  
The opportunity for Brazil to show the principles of the IFP at the 
United Nations occurred when the topic at hand was the Angolan issue. 
However, Brazil’s ambiguity and difficulties in breaking with its commit-
ments to Portugal were noticeable. The war for liberation in Angola worsened 
in the 1960s, gaining space in international discussions. In 1961, the conflict 
was brought to the United Nations by independent African countries. In July, 
Ghana announced the closure of ports and airports to Portuguese vessels 
and aircrafts. Senegal then announced the breaking of diplomatic relations 
with Portugal. In addition to the African countries, England and the USA 
also positioned themselves against Portugal. On the Brazilian side, when 
the issue was the Angolan problem, the country presented itself as a silent 
spectator, abstaining from voting in the United Nations. The ambiguous 
discourse of Afonso Arinos, who reproduced his support for Portugal to 
lead Angola’s independence, stands out here. However, the vote in favor 
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of the Resolution 1.742 presented in the United Nations by initiative of 44 
Afro-Asiatic countries, had the goal of creating institutions under the power 
of the Angolan people. This episode demonstrated the non-compliance with 
Portugal, as well as the vote for the gradual independence of Angola. Such 
actions by Arinos reflected the anti-colonialist values that guided the IFP but 
were questioned by the Senate.
The Government of João Goulart (1961-1964) sought to deepen the 
IFP through the multipolar route, trying to diplomatically articulate relations 
with small and medium powers. The stance in favor of African decolonization 
was understood, internally, as a means of expanding communism in the Bra-
zilian territory, because the African independence movements were seen as 
products of this ideology. The IFP began to be questioned by the conservative 
and military sectors of Brazilian society, as well as receiving coercion from 
Portuguese diplomacy, and Brazil was going through a time of crisis, with 
the IFP gradually losing its effectiveness. Subsequently, the military coup in 
1964 caused African politics and Third World discourse to be replaced by an 
ideological conception of combating the advance of communism.
From 1964 to 1985: from the “automatic alignment” to the 
“responsible pragmatism” that consolidated African policy
According to Rizzi (2014), African policy, in the first two military 
governments, took a more conservative pro-Portugal bias under a geopo-
litical view of relations with the continent; the following governments, 
especially from 1970 onwards, positioned Africa in Brazilian foreign policy, 
somewhat systematizing the future Brazilian presence in newly indepen-
dent states. During this period, Brazil’s African policy did not advance 
compared to the IFP period, but it did not mean an abandonment. Ins-
tead, political-economic cooperation was replaced by a geopolitical aspect 
followed by the associated liberalism of the Castello Branco government in 
the face of the struggle against the communist threat, which defined the 
new guidelines of Brazilian foreign policy from 1964 to 1969.
The Castello Branco government’s Diplomacy of National Interest 
(1964-1967) was aimed at a rapprochement with the United States, invoking 
a discourse more linked to Portugal. According to Penha:
The government [...] insisted on the idea that Brazilian policy towards 
Africa should take into account Brazil’s traditional affection for Portu-
gal and advocated the formation of an Afro-Brazilian community as a 
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“first window” to affirm Brazil’s leadership in the South Atlantic (Penha 
2011, 162).
The new conduct deepened the internal atmosphere in which African 
liberation movements seemed to be linked to communism, identifying South 
Africa as the only reliable partner. Thus, a triangular space was created in the 
Atlantic, where the three “free” and Western capitals (Brasília-Lisbon-Pretoria) 
built an alliance against the threat of communism in other African nations 
(Saraiva 1996). 
According to Vizentini (2004a), African politics in the Castello Branco 
government was characterized by two impulses: first, a cordial greeting to Third 
World delegations in world forums; and the search for new markets. However, 
such impulses were annulled by Westernism and by commitments with the 
ex-metropolis, as Brazilian strategists feared the installation of communist 
regimes on the Atlantic coast of Africa. The solution adopted was to break 
the diplomatic discourse of the previous government, as well as to strengthen 
the link with Portugal, supporting Portuguese colonialism as the best way to 
prevent the establishment of communist regimes.  
In this sense, the Castello Branco government’s ambiguity towards 
Africa was in its condemnation of colonial rule, while unconditionally suppor-
ting the positions of the Salazar government and, on the other hand, in its 
condemnation of the Apartheid regime, while considering South Africa as the 
main economic partner in sub-Saharan Africa. However, according to Penha 
(2011), the explanation could be in the Brazilian posture of maintaining the 
ideological alignment with the USA. This ambiguity will gradually diminish 
as Brazil’s influence in the South Atlantic increases6. 
The “Diplomacy of Prosperity” of the government of General Arthur 
da Costa e Silva (1967-1969) meant the gradual resumption of the subject of 
development and the adoption of a multipolar bias for diplomacy, in a pers-
pective of South-South relations, previously evidenced in the IFP. African 
policy followed the economic and commercial interests of conquering new 
markets and supplying the national demand for oil. The consolidation of geo-
political perceptions is noticeable, since “[...] it was a matter of maintaining 
the Brazilian influence in the Atlantic by economic means and by a peaceful 
policy, without the direct interference of external powers and without the 
collective security pacts” (Saraiva 1996, 128-129).  
6 The 1st Brazilian trade mission to West Africa (1965) visited Senegal, Liberia, Ghana, Nige-
ria, Cameroon, and Côte D’Ivoire. In 1966, the 2nd mission covered South Africa, Mozambi-
que, Angola, Ghana, and Côte D’Ivoire.
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The projection of Brazil was marked, in the government of General 
Emílio Garrastazu Médici (1969-1974), by the new commercial partners, as 
a result of the consolidation of a new look towards Africa. Foreign policy was 
oriented towards the objectives of a new regional power, in which the South 
Atlantic was incorporated as a facilitating space for navigation, as well as a 
geostrategic environment for national development, because “[...] security 
issues were subordinated to those of development” (Saraiva 1996, 130).  
It is worth noting that the Natal-Dakar distance was mentioned 
during the government as an aspect of easy communication with the African 
continent – the distance of 1,600 miles made it possible to build commercial 
maritime corridors, enabling exchange actions at lower costs. In addition, 
another strategic measure was the extension of the Brazilian territorial sea 
to the 200 nautical mile range in 1970. According to Saraiva (1996), the 
involvement of the African countries of the Atlantic coast in consenting to 
the decision of the Médici government was another purpose of this measure. 
In 1968, MRE Minister Magalhães Pinto announced that Brazilian society, as 
well as his government, repudiated the issue of racial discrimination in South 
Africa and around the world, and stressed that the government supported 
all efforts to combat racial discrimination in Africa. There is an important 
change of attitude, since the Castello Branco government had not spoken 
out on African issues.
In the world system, anti-colonialism was perceived in two ways: 
“[...] the metropolises preached that colonial countries should first develop 
to achieve independence, while the colonies argued that before development 
came independence” (Vizentini 2004a, 178). For Dávila (2010, 4), decoloniza-
tion changed this scenario shaped by the African diaspora, besides having a 
significant impact on Brazilian thinking and its connections with the national 
development project. In its broadest sense, this transformed the Brazilian 
state’s responses to the Cold War, creating a space for Brazilian diplomats 
to propose alternatives to the logic of an “iron curtain” dividing East and 
West. On the Brazilian side, there were frictions with Portugal, the USA, 
European colonial powers, and South Africa, which exercised a blockade on 
the development of Brazilian diplomacy for Africa. At the United Nations, 
Brasília voted with Lisbon on the question of overseas provinces, along with 
Washington, London, Madrid, and Pretoria.  
However, Brazil preferred to adopt a silent stance. Nonetheless, Gei-
sel and Delfim Neto, president of Petrobras and Finance Minister respectively, 
suggested Brazil’s entry into the African continent through the Portuguese 
Overseas Provinces, taking a different path:  
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To separate metropolitan Portugal, with whom the development of bila-
teral relations, cultural, and commercial exchanges, convention on 
rights and duties was sought, from colonialist Portugal, with whom Bra-
zil should avoid political, military or commercial involvement, and who 
should be denied support for the theory of legal fiction of overseas pro-
vinces (Visentini 2004a, 179).
With the effects of the Brazil-Portugal relation, the Brazilian discou-
rse was marked by the absence of the term “overseas provinces”, with the 
use of such an expression being avoided in official documents and business 
plans. In addition, Brazil shied away from consulting Portugal on Angolan 
oil exploration, as well as opening up commercial networks between Angola 
and Mozambique. The trip (1972) under the leadership of Chancellor Mario 
Gibson Barboza was the target of Portuguese opposition and suffered inter-
nally from the divergence between the Ministry of Finance, whose desire was 
the approximation with the Portuguese colonies, and the Itamaraty, whose 
preference was directed to the independent countries7. 
Hence, the 1970s represented a deep projection of Brazil towards 
Africa, differing from previous years, in which the discourse was based on 
solidarity between peoples. At this moment, the continent started to repre-
sent the strategic-commercial space for the expansion of Brazilian products, 
as well as for the exchange of oil. With the two oil crises, in 1973 and 1979, 
according to Rizzi (2014, 83), this product was “the first responsible for the 
attraction that Africa exerted on Brazil, due to the Brazilian energy needs”. 
That is why Brazil’s maneuver was to get closer to new partners: Angola, 
Nigeria, Gabon, Congo, and Zaire. This is the key point of Brazil’s African 
policy, national viability and international permissibility.
Trade with South Africa continued, but Brazil gradually positioned 
itself against Apartheid. Brazil-Portugal relations continued to be privileged 
when, in May 1973, Médici visited Portugal. However, the contradiction in 
Brazil’s stance in international forums remained, while the country gradually 
systematized its position against colonialism and racism. This stance was per-
ceived at the XXVI General Assembly of the United Nations, in 1972, where 
Brazil was in favor of the adoption of Resolution 2.278, whose purpose was 
to legitimately consider the liberation movements of Angola, Mozambique, 
and Cape Verde/Guiné-Bissau (Rizzi 2014). 
President Ernesto Beckmann Geisel’s “Responsible and Ecumeni-
cal Pragmatism” (1974-1979) launched the II National Development Plan, 
7 It covered Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal, Ghana, Togo, Daomé (Benin), Nigeria, Cameroon, Zaire, 
and Gabon. 
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deepening the process of industrialization through import substitution. The 
diversification of Brazil’s international relations was solidified; with Chan-
cellor Antônio Azeredo da Silveira, the subject of African decolonization 
was put on the agenda, as his management sought to “harmonize national 
interests” (Azeredo Da Silveira 1974a apud Rizzi 2014) with African countries. 
In 1974, Azeredo da Silveira exposed Brazil’s new policy for Africa, based 
on three aspects:
a) increased cooperation, in the South-South modality, for the benefit 
of mutual development; b) respect for the principles of sovereignty and 
self-determination of States and the economic independence of socie-
ties; c) rejection of colonialism and racial discrimination, with support 
for the independence of Namibia and the black majority government of 
Zimbabwe [...] and to the newly independent Portuguese States (Cervo 
and Bueno 2008, 422).
It is important to highlight, as a segment in the Brazil-Africa trade 
during the 1970s and 1980s, that the sale of Brazilian arms made Brazil the 
largest supplier of arms to the African continent, because both of the military 
production capacity that the country began to develop and of the denunciation 
of the 1977 Treaty of Friendship and Consultation with the USA (according 
to Penha, 2011). From 1974 on, when the Brazilian war industry advanced, it 
recognized spaces to export, whose main destinations were Nigeria (mainly), 
followed by  Gabon, Morocco, Sudan, Burkina Faso, and Zimbabwe. However, 
the problem generated was the supposed inconvenience for some sectors 
regarding the export of other industrial goods, but “[...] the truth is that the 
politicization of arms sales in the period was never proven, except later (1988), 
in the case of US pressure against the sale of one billion dollars in arms from 
Brazil to Libya” (Penha 2011, 173). 
The desire to change the country’s position in the hierarchy of the 
world system led to replacing the ideology of “communist danger” and “Wes-
tern security” with a strategy of rapprochement with Africa, since the conti-
nent was incorporated in the “renegotiation of Brazil’s dependence” on the 
world economy, especially with regard to the USA. Thus, it can be seen that 
Brazil’s projection onto the South Atlantic, through African politics, did not 
foster the ideological struggle against communism, but rather fed the con-
quest of future markets (Saraiva 1996). 
The Portuguese ideological discourse of “civilizing mission” and 
“lusotropicalism” continued with the replacement of Salazar by Marcelo Cae-
tano in 1968. However, the Carnation Revolution in April 1974 represented 
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the end of that “mission” and its greatest result was the independence of the 
Portuguese colonies in Africa. Furthermore, “the ambiguous position that 
for more than 20 years brought Brazil closer and further removed it from 
Africa, in an oscillating policy, was closed” (Rizzi 2014, 84). 
Although in November 1973 Brazil was the only Third World country 
that did not vote for Bissau-Guinean independence at the UN, on July 16, 
1974 Brazil finally recognized the independence of the Republic of Guinea-
Bissau, unilaterally declared in September 1973. The year 1975 was marked by 
great changes: Brazil installed a Special Representation in Luanda in March 
and officialized another one in Maputo – which ended up not opening; on 
June 25, Mozambique proclaimed its independence8; Cape Verde, on July 5; 
São Tomé e Princípe, on July 12. Subsequently, the country was the first to 
recognize the independence of the People’s Republic of Angola under the 
government of the Movement for the Liberation of Angola on November 11, 
1975. According to Rizzi (2014, 85), “... this prestige towards the independence 
of all the PALOP (Portuguese-speaking African countries) countries must be 
interpreted as part of the Brazilian strategy to place itself as a bridge country 
between the interests of the First and Third World”. For Penha (2011), the 
recognition of the Marxist governments of Angola and Mozambique meant 
a rupture of the ideological conception that led foreign policy to the South 
Atlantic and Africa, and in so being, the beginning of a new stage of Afri-
can politics. After these recognitions, President Geisel and Itamaraty were 
criticized by the press, civil society, public opinion, and the military. This 
posture not only influenced Brazil’s African politics, but also had positive 
consequences on the relations with the Third World, in addition to the cou-
ntry’s disengagement from the image of support for Portuguese colonialism 
and consolidating its African policy.
The African policy of the João Baptista Figueiredo Government (1979-
1985) continued the bases of the Geisel administration. According to Cervo 
and Bueno (2008), on the one hand, Africa represented an alternative to 
protectionism and customs barriers by rich countries and their exports, and, 
on the other hand, Brazil meant for Africa a new source for the supply of 
goods and services, replacing its independence from former metropolises. 
Figueiredo was the first Brazilian president to visit Africa between November 
14 and 21, 1983 (Nigeria, Senegal, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, and Algeria).
In this context, African policy was consolidated during the govern-
ment of Figueiredo, systematizing a “pioneerism-reciprocity-respect” (Saraiva 
Guerreiro apud Rizzi 2014), with a preferential look at the Portuguese-spe-
8 Brazil was not invited to participate in the Mozambican independence party.
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aking countries, without neglecting the other African regions. It should be 
noted that during this period, economic and cooperation relations intensified. 
The 1980s were characterized by changes in the world system and in the 
internal sphere; in fact, Chancellor Ramiro Saraiva endeavored to maintain 
Brazil’s autonomy through a universalist foreign policy, upholding the prin-
ciples of Responsible Pragmatism.
Despite the effects of the “lost decade” and of the war in Southern 
Africa, Brazil’s African policies followed a line of action in the political, eco-
nomic, and cultural fields, with emphasis on the rapprochement with Angola 
and on criticism of Apartheid. It is interesting to clarify that economic coo-
peration with African oil-exporting partners has taken place through the 
expedient of countertrade, since this method is preferred when there is a 
shortage of foreign exchange and surpluses in goods and services between 
trading partners. 
The relationship between Brasília and Pretoria, in the 1970s, was 
characterized by distance and, in the 1980s, by a near freeze. According to 
Penna Filho (2011), some factors explain it: the first is due to the end of the 
contradiction of the African policy of Brazil after the Portuguese decoloni-
zation that leveraged decision making; the second, the criticism of the inter-
national community against the Apartheid regime, especially the Afro-Asian 
countries; the third, the diversification of trade partners in the 1970s. It is 
agreed that the proximity with Pretoria was “based on a strategic calculation 
of commercial and economic relations”, becoming a “conscious pragmatism” 
(Penna Filho 2001, 81).   
The impulse of the relations with Africa, legitimized by cultural ties, 
allowed the conquest of new markets, since the continent was primordial 
for the national development project, given the category of lesser relative 
development of the African countries. In addition, it led to the emergence of 
technical partnerships9 that engaged in technology transfer, human resources 
training and the possibility of providing Brazil with primary products. It is 
worth mentioning the opening of African countries to the entry of Brazilian 
companies providing services, especially those focused on the construction 
of public works and infrastructure, as well as oil exploration (Santana 2003). 
As it has been shown, since 1974, there had no longer been any way 
to sustain an ambiguous policy that tried to sustain sentimental ties with 
Portugal and the attempt to further approach African peoples. The oil crises, 
the Carnation Revolution in Portugal and its consequences on Brasília-Lis-
9 Brazil started to sign general cooperation agreements with all the PALOP countries and 
most of the African countries from then on. 
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bon relations, the changes that occurred in the world system, as well as the 
effectiveness of Geisel’s method of “ecumenical and responsible pragmatism” 
provided Brazil with a more active and autonomous change of position on 
the African continent.
Conclusions
It was sought to verify that the ambiguity between the Brazilian poli-
tical discourse and foreign practice towards the Portuguese colonies between 
1961 and 1985 was evident in the official political alignment between Portugal 
and Brazil, due to the Treaty of Friendship and Consultation, of 1953. After 
the application of the hypothetical-deductive method and the analyses, the 
research question was corroborated and it was concluded that the aspects that 
exerted influence on the definition of African policy in Brazil were the 1953 
Treaty and the relations with South Africa. In this point there is agreement 
with Saraiva, when he points out that Brazil initially had two African policies: 
on the one hand, there was the “general policy of rapprochement” to the con-
tinent, whose strand was based on political solidarity to decolonization, and, 
on the other hand, there was the “policy of admissibility of the continuation 
of colonialism in the case of the Portuguese colonies in Africa” (Saraiva 1996, 
88). Brazilian support for Portuguese colonialism has established an initial 
blockade since the 1950s to consolidate its African policy, which is forming 
as the African agenda progressively increases Brazil’s foreign agenda (politics 
and trade).
In addition, we agree with Penna Filho (2010), who identifies that 
the two obstacles to the development of African policy were Brazil’s support 
for Portuguese colonialism, already commented, and relations with South 
Africa, due to its policy of racial segregation: both Portugal and South Africa 
were not accepted by most African states, resulting, thus, in a difficulty in 
bringing Brazil closer to African governments. As it turned out, only with 
the end of the Portuguese decolonization process in the 1970s, Brazil was 
projected to Africa under a pragmatic and autonomous bias. The permissi-
ble international conjuncture of the first half of the 1970s and the national 
viability allowed the country to finish the ambiguity at the time when the 
independence of the Portuguese colonies in Africa officially occurred. In 
addition, it is also understood that African policy is consolidated precisely at 
a time when the political-strategic aspects of Africa and the South Atlantic are 
fully incorporated into Brazilian foreign policy, in a two-way, complex process.
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The consolidation of Africa in the Brazilian foreign policy agenda in 
the 1970s and 1980s was the result of the ideological rupture, which began 
to have less and less weight in Brazil’s international projection, and of the 
internal and international possibilities, caused by the oil crisis of 1973. This 
period represented a deep projection of Brazil towards Africa, differing from 
previous years, in which the discourse was based on solidarity between peo-
ples. Until the end of the Military Regime, the African continent began to 
represent a strategic-commercial space for the expansion of Brazilian pro-
ducts, shaping the African policy of Brazil.
Therefore, it is understood that this ambiguity between the discourse 
and practice of Brazilian foreign policy resulted in the formation of a spe-
cific profile of African policy, in which Portugal and the PALOP countries 
and South Africa continue to play a leading role, for the reasons previously 
identified. Then, as a result of African policy, in the 1980s, Brazil assertively 
projected itself into the South Atlantic, aiming to make this area a zone free 
of bipolar tensions, by the autonomous mechanism without the interference 
of the great powers, with the creation of the South Atlantic Peace and Coo-
peration Zone (ZOPACAS) in conjunction with neighboring countries. This 
Brazilian proposal at the United Nations General Assembly revealed the 
importance that Brazil attached to newly independent African countries and 
South American neighbors. It is also observed that Brazilian foreign policy 
for the South Atlantic was mapped by geostrategic tones, since it ensured a 
multilateral cooperation space where the flow of energy products became vital 
to Brazilian interests. Thus, Brazil’s African policy is the result of internal 
possibilities combined with the challenges of the world system, leading to 
a permanent agenda for Brazilian foreign policy and more consistent and 
pragmatic decision-making, which has been maintained with moments of 
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The objective of the article is to analyze the ambiguity between the political discou-
rse and the Brazilian external practice in relation to the Portuguese colonies in the 
period between the Treaty of Friendship and Consultation with Portugal, through the 
Independent Foreign Policy (PEI) and the Military Regime (total period 1953 to 1985). 
Methodologically, the research uses the quantitative-qualitative approach applying 
the hypothetical-deductive method, while it is classified as descriptive-explanatory 
regarding the objectives. In relation to the procedures, the bibliographic revision, 
the documentary analysis of primary, secondary and press sources was used. It is a 
generative question that Brazilian support for Portuguese colonialism established 
an initial blockade to consolidate its African policy, which will gradually form as 
the African agenda increases in the political and commercial agenda of Brazil in 
the 1970s. It is preliminarily identified that the Brazilian support to the Portuguese 
colonialism established an initial blockade to consolidate its African policy, that is 
being formed as the African agenda progressively increases in the external agenda 
of Brazil (political and commercial) in the decade 1970.
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